by Katherine Delgado
The First Climate Refugee?
In 2013, a family from the small Pacific Island country of Kiribati left their home in Tarawa, Kiribati and headed to New Zealand. Ioane Teitiota and his family became the first to apply for refugee status due to the impacts of climate change – stating that climate change had created unsuitable living conditions in Kiribati and had devastated the island so much that it was no longer safe for them to live there. A primary concern of Teitiota and other I-Kiribati is sea level rise, seeing as the islands of Kiribati sit only 2 – 3 meters above sea level (Aust, 2020).
The Immigration and Protection Tribunal in New Zealand rejected their application, and the High Court, Court of Appeal, and Supreme Court of New Zealand upheld the rejection due to insufficient risk of persecution if they were to go back to Kiribati. With this decision, the Teitiotas were deported back to Kiribati (ibid.). Their decision may have come as a surprise to many I-Kiribati, whereas Kiribati suffers from coastal erosion, coastal inundation, and sea water intrusion resulting in soil infertility. Combined with poor sanitation and air and water pollution, these conditions affect access to freshwater, land for growing food, homes, and the islands themselves (Wey, 2021). While this leaves the people of Kiribati with few options, many are not willing to migrate and instead wish to make conditions on Kiribati suitable for their communities to continue to thrive, but climate change and its unforgiving impacts continues to hinder such a possibility.
Kiribati is just one country and community out of many impacted by climate change in this way. The story of Kiribati is familiar in nearby islands, including Tuvalu, Fiji, Tonga, and others. The Pacific islands make up only 0.03% of global emissions, yet they continue to bear the brunt of the impacts, and they remain as one region in the forefront of the climate crisis (Parsons, 2022). In turn, people are displaced from their communities either by force or necessity – and this phenomenon is not unique to the Pacific.
As climate change becomes increasingly relevant and pressing, there will be more cases like the Teitiota family’s – and there already are – in every part of the world. Because of this, it is imperative that advocacy for migrants is included in advocacy for climate change, and vice versa. The intersection between the two is becoming increasingly apparent, and it is essential to acknowledge the rights of migrants in climate change advocacy. Further, the causes and historical contexts of climate migration are important to distinguish, as well as the roots of such causes and where climate migration stands today.
Why Language Matters
The term ‘environmental refugee’ was first coined in the 1970s, but it didn’t gain substantial attention and discussion until the mid 1980s, when writer Essam El-Hinnawi wrote a paper on environmental refugees for the UN Environment Programme in 1985 (Berchin et al, 2017). He defined environmental refugees as those who ‘have been forced to leave their traditional habitat … because of a marked environmental disruption … that jeopardize their existence and/or seriously affects the quality of their life’. Environmental refugees can also be defined as people whose homes are threatened or destroyed because of climate change induced natural disasters, those who must relocate because of land degradation, those who are victims of land and water rights disputes, those displaced by sea level rise, etc. Other climate crises that are worsened by climate change that can induce climate migration include desertification, drought, flash flooding, and so on (ibid.).
Within Western policies, agencies, and governments, it was historically common for the root causes of climate migration to be attributed to the colonial, third world myth of native land degradation – where native populations overwork their land and generate desertification and soil infertility (Hartmann, 2010). Though this narrative has been, in part, shifted away from and a broader understanding of the conditions that force climate migration is becoming increasingly common, this narrative has been favored in Western circles because it blames native populations for land degradation and attributes the degradation and poverty to over-population and demographic pressure. This allows for them to avoid accountability and meaningful policy enactment to address climate change and harmful resource exploitation practices. Further, this allows them to deny the legacy of resource exploitation/ extraction and commercial agriculture that is the primary cause of climate migration (ibid.). Further, this line of reasoning frames climate migration itself as an environmental threat (the threat of degradation of the land wherever the migrants relocate) instead of the conditions which forced it. Hartmann (2010) explains that the Western interpretation of the term and how it is adopted into policy discussion is harmful because it turns what is an economic and political problem into merely a natural problem, one which is a result of environmental conditions outside of anyone’s control. The language used to define climate migrants seeks to hide the conditions that determine who is going to become a migrant – i.e. which populations are the most vulnerable, and what, if any, aid is provided and for whom. The idea of the environmental migrant who is a victim of natural causes was in some instances, created for Western interests; to transform migration and environmental degradation from a political issue into a natural issue, and to implement stricter immigration control while simultaneously denying the perpetrators of stated environmental degradation the obligation to provide asylum to those migrants (ibid.).
Further, land degradation that results in migration is often attributed to violence between farmers/nomads/others vying for land rights, population growth, and the natural conditions of the land in many (post) colonial regions (ibid.). This explanation carefully disregards conditions like wealth inequality within the region, commercialized unsustainable agriculture, and forced migration that results in forced labor, among others. Climate violence is the idea that unsuitable climate conditions (drought, land degradation, flooding, etc.) can cause farmers and other citizens to fight over land rights, thereby further damaging the land and creating instability within communities. The threat of ‘climate violence’ is entirely dependent on the administration, conflict management, and contextual factors of individual countries, and many places where migration is attributed to climate violence actually see the suppression of climate violence because of sufficient conflict resolution institutions. It is not so much that regions are degrading land by proxy of violence or land disputes, but instead degradation is dependent on the political and social conditions that are present, as well as how the issue is approached (ibid.).
What is more important than blaming climate migration on unsubstantiated claims of regional violence and a supposed inability of native people to manage their land sustainably is acknowledging the societal factors and the legacy of resource exploitation that ultimately created the foundations for said societal factors. Further, the implementation – or a lack thereof – of adaptation techniques and resources determines how a community will be able to deal with a climate crisis that has the potential to force migration. This, as well as accountability for the conditions created by settlers and extractive colonialism, is often left out of discussions about climate refugees.
In understanding why there are climate refugees, and in attempting to offer solutions and resources for it, it is crucial to understand harmful rhetoric and narratives about the cause of environmental degradation, because that impacts how aid is delivered, in what form, and to whom. In the case of environmental refugees, language is everything – because it is often construed in a way that places blame and obligation in the wrong hands, and aside from the ethical and moral failings of such a construction, it has tangible effects on how people view migrants, what type of policies and assistance is offered to affected communities, and where, to whom, and how much aid (and sympathy) is given.
Who are the Climate Refugees of Today and Tomorrow?
As climate change becomes an increasingly pressing problem, and as many nations responsible for its continued threat are slow or unwilling to make changes to alleviate it, there will be more climate refugees. Unsurprisingly, modern climate change refugees come from every corner of the globe – though some places more than others, and some communities in those places being affected more than others.
As explained, the Pacific Island nations are among some of the most threatened populations and communities on the planet. This is due to sea level rise, resource and land exploitation, etc. – both of which result in land degradation and coastal erosion and inundation.
Each year, tens of thousands of people from the Pacific migrate to other nations, and in some cases, this results in depopulation of many Pacific islands and thus a loss of culture and their homelands (Salem & Rosencranz, 2020). Further, climate disasters and climate change often make land untenable, damaging subsistence agriculture and local economies. Thus, people migrate internally, often to urban areas or other islands – but employment is sparse in those places, and climate disasters impact them too, so often, they end up migrating internationally (ibid.). As the president of the Federated States of Micronesia put it at the 2009 UN General Assembly on climate change, where he placed this issue into a human rights context, this has impacts on their ‘security and territorial integrity, and on our very existence as inhabitants over very small and vulnerable island nations’ (ibid.).
In addition to coastal and island communities, drylands are among the most vulnerable to climate change, and produce millions of climate refugees. Drylands are especially vulnerable to drought, desertification, and degradation that impacts their already sensitive soil fertility (Huang et al 2017). Drylands are home to nearly 3 billion people, around 38% of the global population. Huang et al (2017) explain that the increase in warming and the expected increase in dryland temperatures is attributed to both natural processes (i.e. El Nino Southern Oscillation), and human induced climate change. Further, land use change and development in drylands exacerbate the conditions created by climate change.
In the past year, Somalia reached record high numbers of climate change induced displacement, reaching 3.8 million people. This is primarily due to five years of below average rainy seasons and drought, which forces people to be internally displaced to larger cities, many of them never to return to their homes (International Organization for Migration, 2023). Somalia’s dryland and semi-arid regions are among the most vulnerable areas in the world for climate change, alongside parts of eastern Australia, South Sudan, Afghanistan, Chad, and other dry regions. As such, many of these countries are seeing internal and external displacement, and it is imperative that the local and international community addresses not only climate change and its disproportionate impacts but also how and where to allocate resources and protection for people in need.
Not only is climate migration an environmental and social issue, but it is also an issue of race and class. Climate change impacts damage developing countries disproportionately, where they simultaneously bear 75% of financial costs of climate crises despite only contributing 10% of greenhouse gas emissions (Alston, 2019). Thus, these nations are forced to live in a cycle of poverty and debilitating climate crises. Further, Alston (2019) explains in the UN Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, that often, wealthy members of a society in danger of climate disasters will escape the crisis, leaving the brunt of the disaster to be borne by marginalized groups, which are often defined by divisions of race and class.
Further, black and brown communities both in the global south and north are most susceptible to climate disasters, and they have been subjected to social and economic vulnerability and poverty by political, economic, and military interventions by way of colonialism, resource exploitation, and forced labor (Gonzalez, 2020). Further, the demonization of migrants and the violent restriction and prohibition of immigration by Western countries further contributes to the subjugation of these people to climate disasters and allows for climate refugees to be denied asylum (ibid.). The environmental degradation inflicted by the fossil fuel industry that is facilitated through the extraction, combustion, and transportation of fossil fuels also disproportionately impacts black, brown, and poor communities across the world. This includes those living in communities alongside polluted air and water, resource extraction and mining that destroys surrounding environments, oil and gas pipelines, etc. (ibid.). Billions of people in these communities will be, and have been, subjected to displacement and forced migration. When developed nations demonize and prohibit migration and refuse to acknowledge climate refugees as valid refugees, while simultaneously subjecting the global poor and black and brown to unlivable conditions through resource extraction and greenhouse gas emissions, it becomes clear that this is not only a climate and migration issue, but an issue of race and class.
This is how climate migration is an issue of intersectional discrimination – where discrimination is carried out on multiple, intersecting fronts. This is the case for the communities disproportionately impacted by climate change that are black and brown and impoverished. Further, there is also an element of intersectional discrimination in the way that climate change impacts women disproportionately to men. This is apparent in an increase of gender based violence in places threatened by conflict and climate disasters, an increase in child marriage in areas impacted by climate change, and the inability for women to carry out tasks that their livelihoods depend on (UNCC, 2022). For example, climate disasters impact accessibility to collecting firewood and water, tasks that are often done by women in many lower income places. Further, agriculture is the primary employment sector for many women in low income countries, and during drought and flooding / erratic rainfall, many women are left without a secure income (UN Women, 2022). Further, climate disasters hinder accessibility to healthcare, maternal health resources, menstrual products, and so on. Intersectional discrimination also plays a role in how women are impacted. Black women, indigenous women, LGBT people, disabled women, migrant women, and women living in rural and conflict ridden areas are disproportionately impacted by these effects (ibid.). Climate change and climate disasters are not only an issue of race and class, but also an issue of gender and the intersection between all of those things, and further intersections exist too – which includes disability and sexuality.
This dynamic has created a system where certain places and communities are designated as inevitable climate disaster zones, where local and national governments are left to cover most of the costs associated with disaster relief and rebuilding (Alston, 2019). In many cases, this becomes impossible, and citizens are displaced, killed, or subjected to unlivable conditions. In such a system, some communities can escape the impacts of climate change, while others are forced to bear the weight of them or bear the weight of hostilities born from migrant status.
Climate migration includes internal displacement, where climate related disasters and conditions force residents to relocate. Climate migration resulting from Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana, USA is a notable example of this. New Orleans lost about half of its residents after the disaster, and a majority of those affected and displaced were the city’s black communities; communities that were underserved in relief efforts and afforded less aid than their white counterparts (Billings et al, 2019). Further, Hurricane Michael in 2018 displaced nearly 500,000 residents in the US Southeast. Often, these migrants are received negatively and blamed for financial hardship, job shortages, and housing shortages – especially when they come from racial and class minorities (Martin, 2019).
Climate change and greenhouse gas emissions know no borders, and they affect everyone and will affect everyone if it is not alleviated. This statement is true, but it is also worth noting that historically and contemporarily, climate change and thus climate migration disproportionately impacts poorer, black and brown countries and communities, and that even within such communities and within developed nations like the UK, United States, Canada, Australia, there is a disparity between who is impacted the most and who has the resources and financial ability to avoid displacement or devastation. Within countries like the US, UK, Canada, and Australia, it is often historically marginalized groups that make up the majority of climate migrants and climate disaster victims – notably black and indigenous communities. Further, it is worth noting that a loss of land and cultural and personal ties to it is a human rights issue in itself – as historically, indigenous cultures and societies have been eradicated and threatened, and the forced displacement of these groups by way of a lack of climate reform and disaster relief is an extension of such a practice. As such, there is a clear thread that interweaves climate change, migration, and loss of culture and community. This phenomenon is not random, and there is a history of colonialism, resource and labor exploitation, and rhetoric concerning black and brown communities and migration that has led to such communities bearing the brunt of climate change and being displaced and marginalized as a result.
Where does Climate Refugee Status stand Today?
In 1984, ten Latin American countries adopted the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, a legally non-binding document that sought to recognize and offer support and assistance to Central and South American refugees. The Declaration is cited as the source of the broad definition of “refugees”: ‘persons who have fled their country because their lives, safety or freedom have been threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violation of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order.” The declaration was created following the refugee crisis in Central and South America, notably those escaping the violence of various coups in the region (Reed-Hurtado, 2013). Today, this declaration is discussed in part in the context of the large number of climate refugees from Latin America and the increasing threat of climate disasters and displacement (Koenning-Rutherford, 2024). While several Central and South American countries have adopted the declaration, The US has not, nor have there been many recent efforts to amend asylum laws to offer protection for those whose lives or well beings would be threatened upon returning to their original country due to climate conditions or a climate related disaster. Further, there are currently still no legal protections in the US offered to climate refugees nor are they officially recognized by international law, in terms of both internal and external migration (Mile, 2021).
While the Global Compact for Migration – a nonbinding international agreement – does not directly offer legal protection for climate migrants, it recognizes that members recognize that climate change plays a role in certain refugee movements (Mile, 2021). Further, the Report of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in the Global Compact on Refugees 2018 claims that although climate and environmental degradation are not the immediate causes of migration, they can interact with the causes and can thus be harmful to some extent (ibid.). However, this section is minimal and fails to adequately address how climate often is the cause, and the primary one at that.
Finally, the 2015 Paris Agreement Climate Conference developed a task force to “develop recommendations to avert, minimize, and address displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change” (ibid.). Though they offer advice on drafting national asylum legislation, increasing research, increasing the preparedness of impacted areas, developing contingency plans, and facilitating safe migration of people – there is still no legal protection for environmental refugees – which is arguably among the most important aspects of migration, and without recognition in the 1951 Refugee Convention, it will remain difficult for climate refugees to be protected. In addition to a lack of official recognition and protection, anti-migration policies and inhumane treatment of migrants that make it difficult for anyone to seek asylum will only further this lack of safety and protection.
Climate migrants exist whether there is a legal classification for them or not and whether global leaders and international organizations want to extend protections for them or not. When fossil fuel use, emissions, unsustainable resource extraction, unsustainable commercial agriculture, and so on trigger climate crises and force people out of their homes and destroy environments, there will be climate migrants whether or not governments of developed nations want there to be. When the listed causes of climate crises are set into motion primarily by those developed nations and little is being done to curb them, it begs the question of whether there is a climate migration crisis or an accountability crisis.
Conclusion
When the climate crisis devastates landscapes, inhibits rainfall, causes floods, sinks islands, etc. – it is not just the land that is being devastated. Communities and homes are destroyed, and the people in those communities can suffer and sometimes die if they are not forcibly displaced or cannot migrate. This is why human induced climate change is not only an environmental disaster that impacts the land, water, and the atmosphere, but also the people who use the land, water, and atmosphere. Often, those impacted most are displaced and become climate migrants, and are sometimes met with hostility and demonization, and a lack of legal protection either way.
Climate change and migration are both intertwined with social and political justice – because it is the most marginalized and disenfranchised populations of the world that are disproportionately impacted by climate change and that are displaced. Further, climate change and its harms and subsequent migration are borne from colonial legacies of resource exploitation and destabilization; making those who were and are victim to colonial projects most vulnerable to the very thing – climate disasters – that directly results from their subjugation. Therefore, when addressing migration, climate change, (de)colonization, and global social justice – they must all be addressed, because they are all directly related.
Further, it is important to explicitly state which populations are most vulnerable to climate change and displacement. Black, brown, and indigenous populations in every part of the world are most vulnerable, and it is because of colonialism and racism that such is the case. This is also a reason why climate migration is not treated as a pressing concern to many world leaders and why many world leaders are unwilling to provide resources, protection, and plans to curb climate change. All of these factors make climate change and migration a paramount human rights concern that must be addressed and acted on in terms of social and political justice.
As emissions continue to increase and flooding, drought, and coastal erosion – to name a few – continue to devastate landscapes and communities, there will only be more climate migrants and those who cannot migrate for financial or physical reasons. These people cannot be discarded, brushed off, or demonized to the point where they are given no resources or protections. There are already more families like the Teitiotas of Kiribati, and there will be more, from all over the world. The Teitiotas could be anyone in the world – even the leaders and government members of the places that are denying asylum to climate migrants and the governments and corporations facilitating and exacerbating climate change. The climate disaster does not discriminate by itself, so neither should world leaders and their policies.
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